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THE LAW GOVERNING medical staff peer review at California hos-
pitals has changed dramatically over the last thirty years. The days
when a hospital could make arbitrary credentialing decisions without
affording physicians any recourse are long gone. Primarily as a result
of appellate court decisions and legislation, there has been a steady
movement toward the formalization of peer review. This article exam-
ines the development of peer review law at California hospitals.' It
also identifies a number of shortcomings in the current system and
suggests solutions to these problems.
California hospitals help ensure that patients receive high quality
medical care by establishing the qualifications for physicians on their
medical staffs. State statutes and regulations require all hospitals to
have a medical staff.2 The medical staff is an unincorporated associa-
tion comprised of doctors who have privileges to practice medicine at
* Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, Fullerton, California.
1. The discussion does not cover peer review in state or county hospitals or hospitals
affiliated with the University of California, as they are bound by due process requirements.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.7 (West 2003).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250(a) (West Supp. 2003) (regulating general
acute care hospitals):
The rules of the hospital, established by the board of directors pursuant to this
article, shall include all of the following: (1) Provision for the organization of
physicians and surgeons, podiatrists, and dentists licensed to practice in this state
who are permitted to practice in the hospital into a formal medical staff, with
appropriate officers and bylaws and with staff appointments on an annual or bien-
nial basis.
Id. § 32128(a) (1) (regulating district hospitals); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70703(a)
(2002), which provides in pertinent part: "Each hospital shall have an organized medical
staff responsible to the governing body for the adequacy and quality of the medical care
rendered to patients in the hospital." The regular practice of medicine in a licensed gen-
eral or specialized hospital having five or more physicians and surgeons, which does not
have rules established for the organization of "a formal medical staff with appropriate of-
ficers and bylaws[,]" constitutes "unprofessional conduct." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2282.
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a hospital.3 The medical staff must promulgate bylaws that, among
other things, provide for the evaluation of qualifications of new appli-
cants and establish mechanisms for disciplining existing members. 4 It
also must establish procedures for granting and withdrawing clinical
privileges.5 The medical staff evaluates physicians and confers mem-
bership and privileges, subject to the hospital governing board's ap-
proval.6 For these reasons, the medical staff is a very powerful
authority at any hospital. It is a self-governing body7 responsible for
making many important decisions affecting patient care.
It is almost impossible for a physician to practice medicine today
unless she is a medical staff member at one or more hospitals. This is
because a doctor cannot regularly admit or treat patients unless she is
a member of the medical staff. Privileges are especially important for
specialists, like surgeons, who perform the majority of their services in
a hospital setting. For this reason, a hospital's decision to deny mem-
bership or clinical privileges, or to discipline a physician, can have an
3. Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 73 Cal. Rptr.
2d 695, 699 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).
4. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70703(b).
The medical staff, by vote of the members and with the approval of the governing
body, shall adopt written by-laws which provide formal procedures for the evalua-
tion of staff applications and credentials, appointments, reappointments, assign-
ment of clinical privileges, appeals mechanisms and such other subjects or
conditions which the medical staff and governing body deem appropriate. The
medical staff shall abide by and establish a means of enforcement of its by-laws.
Id. There is a split of authority over whether medical staff bylaws create an enforceable
contract between the physician and the hospital. In Janda v. Madera Community Hospital, 16
F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 1998), a United States District Court, applying California
law, held that they do. A panel of the California Court of Appeal disagreed in O'Byrne v.
Santa Monica-UCLA Medical Center, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 585 (Ct. App. 2001). Nevertheless,
courts agree that medical staff bylaws are binding on physicians and hospitals because the
law requires it. Id. at 583.
5. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70703(b). "Clinical privileges" means: "Authorization
granted by the appropriate authority (for example, a governing body) to a practitioner to
provide specific care services in an organization within well-defined limits, based on the
following factors, as applicable: license, education, training, experience, competence,
health status, and judgment." JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS,
2002 COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HospITALs: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK
GL-5 (2002).
6. A hospital's governing body is "[t]he individual(s), group, or agency that has ulti-
mate authority and responsibility for establishing policy, maintaining care quality, and pro-
viding for organization management and planning." Id. at GL-9. This governing body may
also be called "the board, board of trustees, board of governors, board of commissioners,
and partners (networks)." Id.
7. The governing body of the hospital, in its bylaws, must provide for "self-govern-
ment by the medical staff with respect to the professional work performed in the hospital."
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70701 (a)(1) (F).
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immediate and devastating effect on a practitioner's career. She may
be barred from practicing medicine at the hospital or may have her
privileges restricted.
Additionally, as a result of state and federal law, the decision can
have long-term effects on the physician. California law requires hospi-
tals to report certain credentialing decisions8 to the Medical Board of
California by filing a document known as a Section 805 report.9 The
Section 805 report may trigger a Medical Board investigation. The
Medical Board has authority to institute proceedings to revoke, sus-
pend, or limit the license of any physician who poses a danger to the
public. 10 The hospital's decision can also implicate federal law. Re-
sponding to complaints about substandard medical care on a national
level, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act"
("HCQIA") in 1986. This consumer protection legislation, which was
enacted to promote medical peer review,' 2 requires health care enti-
ties to report to the National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Infor-
mation on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners ("NPDB"),
so that the activities of incompetent doctors can be tracked more eas-
ily.' 3 The law requires these entities to report professional review activ-
ities that adversely affect clinical privileges.' 4 "Clinical privileges"
include privileges, medical staff membership, and other circum-
stances pertaining to the furnishing of medical care.' 5
8. The hospital must make a report if a licentiate's application for staff privileges or
membership is denied or rejected for a medical disciplinary cause or reason; if staff privi-
leges, membership, or employment are terminated or revoked for a medical disciplinary
reason; or if restrictions are imposed or voluntarily accepted on staff privileges for a cumu-
lative total of thirty days or more for any twelve-month period for a medical disciplinary
reason. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805(b) (West 2003). (" 'Licentiate' means a physician
and surgeon, podiatrist, clinical psychologist ... or dentist." Id. § 805 (a) (2).) It must also
file a report if, following notice of an impending investigation based on information indi-
cating medical disciplinary cause or reason, a member resigns or takes a leave of absence;
an applicant withdraws or abandons the application; or a member withdraws or abandons a
request for renewal of privileges. Id. § 805(c).
9. Id. § 805(b) (setting out the requirements for the report).
10. Id. §§ 2220-2220.6.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000).
12. Subchapter I of the legislation is entitled "Encouraging Good Faith Professional
Review Activities." Id. § 11111. Congress's findings on the need for effective peer review are
stated in § 11101 (3). For a discussion of events leading to the passage of HCQIA, see Susan
L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications
and Implications, 16 Am.J.L. & MED. 455 (1990).
13. The reporting requirements are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137.
14. Id. § 11133(a).
15. Id. § 11151(3).
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Hospitals monitor the information collected in the NPDB. When
a physician applies, or reapplies, for membership or privileges at a
hospital, or for liability insurance, the applications routinely ask about
her status at all hospitals. A negative decision at an institution can
have a snowball effect. If one hospital has identified quality concerns,
it is very likely that this will lead to investigations at other hospitals.
The physician may also face higher liability insurance premiums or
even cancellation of coverage. The decision can also result in the
diminishment of professional reputation, loss of patients and refer-
rals, and personal humiliation.
For decades, California courts have recognized the importance of
medical staff membership to a physician's career. They treat the right
to practice medicine at a hospital as a property interest that directly
relates to the pursuit of the physician's livelihood. 16 The interest is a
fundamental right. 17 A hospital, whether public or private, cannot
deny medical staff membership or clinical privileges, or discipline an
existing member, without following certain procedures. These rules
are known as common law fair procedure rights.18 Common law fair
procedure requires that a private association's membership qualifica-
tions be substantively fair and rational, and that affected parties be
given an opportunity to challenge adverse decisions. If a hospital de-
cides to deny an application or to discipline a medical staff member,
the individual may contest the decision by means of a hearing before a
panel of her peer physicians.
Peer review is intended to protect the interests of three groups:
patients, hospitals, and physicians.' 9 Its primary purpose is to weed
out incompetent doctors who endanger patient health. After the state
licensing body, hospitals essentially act as secondary gatekeepers for
the medical profession. Through the credentialing process, institu-
tions can limit the practice of physicians who have a record of
problems that involve quality care-giving.
Some believe peer review has not been an effective tool for im-
proving the quality of patient care. Critics claim that entrusting physi-
cians with the responsibility of policing incompetent colleagues has
not worked. 20 A system whereby doctors are expected to investigate
16. Edwards v. Fresno Cnty. Hosp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 579, 580-81 (Ct. App. 1974).
17. Anton v. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162, 1173-75 (Cal. 1977).
18. Westlake Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 410 (Cal. 1976).
19. See Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Ct. App. 1988).
20. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit-Is It Time for
a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 25 (1999).
[Vol. 38
their colleagues and report them to the authorities is fraught with
conflicts of interest.
Statistics show that state licensing agencies seldom take formal
action against doctors. In 2002, the Medical Board of California took
"prejudicial action"21 against 452 physicians out of a total number of
88,149 licensed physicians practicing in the state. 22 This means that
that there were 5.13 prejudicial actions per 1,000 practicing physi-
cians.23 A "Composite Action Index" prepared by the Federation of
State Medical Boards of the United States shows that Medical Board
actions against physicians in California have fluctuated over the last
ten years from a low of 3.02 per 1,000 to a high of 6.10.24 The con-
sumer advocacy group, Public Citizen, ranked California in the mid-
dle of states regarding the number of serious disciplinary actions
taken against its physicians in 2002.25
Some hospitals may be protecting doctors by not filing peer re-
view decisions resulting in discipline as required by law. Nationwide,
the number of hospital reports to the NPDB is small. 2 6 The Medical
21. "Prejudicial actions" are those resulting in loss of license or licensed privilege,
restriction of license or license privilege, or modification of a license or privilege that re-
sults in a penalty or reprimand. THE FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,
SUMMARY OF 2002 BOARD ACTIONS tbl.I (2003).
22. Id. 113,208 physicians held licenses, but not all of the physicians were engaged in
the practice of medicine. Id.
23. This figure does not take into account that more than one prejudicial action may
have been taken against a single physician. Id.
24. Id. at tbl.II. The Composite Action Index ("CAI") takes into account nonprejudi-
cial as well as prejudicial actions. "Nonprejudicial actions" include actions that do not re-
sult in modification or termination of a license or licensed privileges. This action is
frequently administrative in nature, such as a license denial due to lack of qualification or a
reinstatement following disciplinary action. The CAI history for California, with regard to
the number of physicians disciplined, is as follows (where the figures are based on averages
regarding the different types of disciplinary action taken in the state throughout the year):
1993, 3.02; 1994, 3.46; 1995, 5.86; 1996, 5.01; 1997, 5.45; 1998, 5.82; 1999, 6.10; 2000, 5.73;
2001, 4.62; 2002, 5.21. Id.
25. PUB. CITIZEN, RANKING OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN
2002 (HRG PUBLICATION #1658) tbl.1 (2003), http://www.citizen.org/publications/print_
release.cfm?ID=7234#table_1 (last accessed Nov. 22, 2003). Public Citizen is an organiza-
tion founded by Ralph Nader. PUB. CITIZEN, ABOUT PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/
about. It bases its rankings on data obtained from the Federation of State Medical Boards.
PUB. CITIZEN, RANKING OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN 2002
(HRG PUBLICATION #1658), http://www.citizen.org/publications/print-release.cfm?ID=72
34. Public Citizen defines "serious disciplinary actions" as "revocations, surrenders, suspen-
sions, and probation/restrictions." Id. California ranked twenty-fourth in serious discipli-
nary actions in 2002. Id. tbl.1. Over the previous ten years, California's ranking has ranged
from a high of 18 (1997) to a low of 34/35 (1994). Id. tbl.2.
26. See generally Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank: Clinical Privileges Action Reports, JAMA, July 28, 1999, at 349-55 (1999)
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Board of California compiles statistics on Section 805 reports received
from health facilities, which include hospitals. For fiscal year
2000-2001, the total was 135; for 2001-2002, the total was 155.27 The
fact that hospitals in many states face relatively mild sanctions for non-
compliance may account for the underreporting. 2
In 2001, the California legislature addressed this problem by sub-
stantially increasing the amount of fines that may be assessed for fail-
ure to file a Section 805 report. For a willful failure, the person
required to file the report is subject to a maximum penalty of
$100,000.29 If the report is not made for any other reason, the maxi-
mum fine is $50,000.30 Whether these new penalties will encourage
more widespread reporting remains to be seen.
Peer review is also intended to benefit hospitals by allowing them
to set and apply their own standards. Institutions are not required to
grant medical staff privileges to any physician possessing a medical
license. A hospital may enhance its reputation in the medical commu-
nity by being selective and admitting only highly qualified doctors to
its staff.
Peer review also helps hospitals limit their liability for negligence.
California recognizes a negligence cause of action when a hospital
carelessly allows an incompetent doctor to treat patients. 31 The courts
have held that a hospital's failure to ensure the competence of its
medical staff through careful selection and review creates an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to patients. 32 Under the doctrine of corporate
negligence, a hospital may be held liable for injuries caused by doc-
tors with medical staff privileges. A hospital can reduce the risk of
liability for corporate negligence claims by rejecting applicants with
questionable backgrounds and disciplining existing staff members
whose performance is substandard.
(presenting results of a five-year study showing that low and declining levels of hospital
privileges actions were reported to NPDB). According to the authors, more than 65% of all
hospitals reported no privilege actions during the five-year study period. Id. at 351.
27. MED. BD. OF CAL., 2001-2002 ANNUAL REPORT iv (2002).
28. Scheutzow, supra note 20, at 54. The author concludes that more severe penalties
for non-reporting may encourage hospitals to report to the NPDB. Id. at 57.
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805(k) (West 2003). Under the previous law, the maxi-
mum fine for an "intentional" failure to file was $10,000.
30. Id. § 805(1). Under the previous law, the maximum fine for an unintentional fail-
ure to file was $5,000.
31. See Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161 (Ct. App. 1982).
32. See id. at 161; see also Gary F. Loveridge & Betsy S. Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negli-
gence Comes to California: Questions in the Wake ofElam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAC. L.J.
803 (1983).
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The final interest that peer review is intended to protect-the
one that is the primary focus of this article-is the physician's. An
effective peer review system should ensure that qualified doctors are
shielded from arbitrary hospital decisions and the negative conse-
quences accompanying them. Although peer review is criticized as be-
ing physician-friendly, many doctors who are targets of investigation
believe it is arbitrary and unjust because the hospital controls the pro-
cess. The argument is that peer review gives too much power to hospi-
tal decision makers who may have ulterior motives for rejecting an
applicant or disciplining a colleague. The motive can be economic, so
as to limit competition for business. It can be based on bias against
racial or ethnic minorities or women. Graduates of foreign medical
schools may be targets. Peer review can also be used as a forum to act
out personal rivalries and dislikes.3 3 At a time when many hospitals are
concerned about profitability, peer review may be a way to exclude
doctors who fail to generate sufficient income for a particular institu-
tion. 34 The upshot is that a system placing so much power in the
hands of hospital authorities invites abuse.
The courts and legislature have tried to guard against possible
abuses in the credentialing process by formalizing peer review. As a
result of judicial decisions and legislative mandates, physicians now
have the right to contest many adverse hospital decisions. The law has
also standardized many procedures governing peer review. At the
same time, judges and legislators have been reluctant to second-guess
the judgment of medical professionals on substantive medical issues,
so the law accords great deference to the judgment of health care
professionals in matters involving medical expertise.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I reveals that the first
legal requirements of peer review were imposed by the courts when
they extended the rules of common law fair procedure to the activity
of hospitals. The appellate courts held that hospital decisions, both in
admission and disciplinary settings, must be substantially rational and
procedurally fair. At the same time, the courts were sensitive to the
argument that hospital authorities must be free to administer their
institutions. So long as hospitals followed rudimentary fair procedure
33. See generally THE CTR. FOR PEER REviEWJUSTICE, INC., at http://www.peerreview.org
(last accessed Nov. 8, 2003) (discussing physician complaints about peer review); see also
Brock D. Phillips, A Guide to Physician Disciplinary Hearings, CAL. PHYSICIAN, July 1994, at
36-39.
34. Jill K. Silverman, Will Economic Credentialing Invade Your Hospital?, CAL. PHYSICIAN,
Dec. 1991, at 52-55.
Winter 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
requirements, the courts generally deferred to the judgment of health
care professionals.
Part II shows how federal and state legislation in the late 1980s
dramatically changed peer review law by giving physicians rights far
beyond common law fair procedure requirements. As a result, peer
review is a much more formalized process than it was under the judi-
cial precedents. In 1986, Congress enacted legislation requiring hospi-
tals to provide minimum due process in peer review, but it authorized
states to opt out of the congressional plan. California exercised this
option in 1989, when the legislature crafted a series of laws governing
peer review for most California hospitals. The legislative plan estab-
lished minimum mandatory procedures that hospitals must follow
when conducting peer review. This section discusses these
requirements.
Part III considers the important role that a hospital's medical
staff bylaws play in peer review today. California law requires a medical
staff to have bylaws that articulate the process whereby physicians may
dispute credentialing decisions. The California Medical Association
("CMA"), an organization claiming a membership of over 30,000 phy-
sicians, has promulgated Annotated Model Medical Staff Bylaws to as-
sist medical staffs in drafting bylaws. The CMA Model Bylaws
incorporate the requirements of state and federal law, as well as the
standards of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, a group responsible for accrediting hospitals around
the country.3 5 The CMA Model Bylaws give applicants and medical
staff members greater procedural rights than those required by statute
and judicial precedent. This section uses the CMA Model Bylaws as an
illustrative example of how bylaws can affect peer review.
The final section, Part IV, identifies some problems with the cur-
rent peer review system and suggests changes to make it fairer. The
first problem presented is that statutes, cases, and the CMA Model
Bylaws give hospital authorities extensive power to control the peer
review process, thereby creating the danger that those authorities may
improperly affect outcomes. A system vesting so much unchecked au-
thority in the medical staff invites abuse. A danger exists in that peer
review committees may merely be a rubber stamp for the decisions of
hospital authorities. The second problem is that the current system
presents little opportunity for meaningful judicial review of peer re-
view decisions. If a physician wishes to contest a peer review decision
35. See generally CAL. MED. ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAws
(1985-2003) [hereinafter BYLAws].
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in the courts, she must seek a writ of administrative mandamus. 36
However, an amendment to California's administrative mandamus
statute severely limits the power of the courts to review most hospital
decisions. The article concludes by identifying a problem that may re-
sult from the formalization of peer review. There is the danger that
the process has become so time-consuming and expensive that hospi-
tals will be reluctant to take action against incompetent doctors. The
medical profession and the agencies that oversee the health care sys-
tem must carefully monitor the peer review process and guard against
this risk.
I. Common Law Fair Procedure Rights in the Hospital
Setting
The physician's right to procedural safeguards in the credential-
ing process at California hospitals is of judicial creation. During the
second half of the twentieth century, California's appellate courts
held that a medical staff may not deny, revoke, or suspend member-
ship or clinical privileges without according the physician "fair proce-
dure." Fair procedure is a common law concept that originated in the
nineteenth century.3 7 It first applied to expulsions from private as-
sociations such as unions3 8 and fraternal societies.3 9 Later, fair proce-
dure was extended to apply where a person was denied membership
in a private association. 40
Fair procedure prohibits groups from expelling a member or re-
jecting an applicant when the reason underlying the action is irra-
tional or when the organization has proceeded in an unfair manner.4 1
"Taken together, these decisions establish the common law principle
that whenever a private association is legally required to refrain from
arbitrary action, the association must be both substantively rational
and procedurally fair."4 2 Although the courts sometimes use the words
"fair procedure" and "due process" interchangeably, the California
Supreme Court has clarified that the terms are not synonymous. Fair
procedure does not derive from the constitutional guarantees of due
36. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 2003).
37. See generally Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union of S.F., 17
P. 217 (Cal. 1888); see also Von Arx v. S.F. Gruetli Verein, 45 P. 685 (Cal. 1896).
38. See generally Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 231 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1951).
39. Taboada v. Sociedad Espanola de Beneficencia Mutua, 215 P. 673 (Cal. 1923).
40. James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944).
41. Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 259-60 (Cal. 1974)
[hereinafter Pinsker II].
42. Id.
Winter 20041 MEDICAL STAFF PEER REVIEW
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
process, but rather from established common law principles of
fairness. 4 3
The California Supreme Court held that fair procedure applied
in medical settings in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (Pins-
ker I),44 after a private society of dentists had rejected an orthodon-
tist's application for membership. Although membership in the group
was not a requirement for orthodontic practice, the supreme court
found that it would be a practical necessity for one wishing to make a
living in the specialty.
The supreme court later reviewed the same facts in Pinsker JJ.45 In
this opinion, it held that fair procedure has both substantive and pro-
cedural components. An organization cannot reject a member's appli-
cation based on "a rule which is substantively capricious or contrary to
public policy." 46 As to the process required, the court held that the
association must give the applicant notice of the reason for rejection
and afford him an opportunity to respond. 47 These procedures need
not include "all the embellishments of a court trial."48 Rather than fix
a rigid procedure that must invariably be observed, the court left it to
the association to devise the process, subject to judicial review. 49
The requirement of fair procedure, as it applies to a hospital
when it wishes to expel a physician from its medical staff, was first
established in Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Society,50 a widely cited
California Court of Appeal case. The Ascherman court held that fair
procedure includes the right to notice of the charges against the indi-
vidual and a meaningful hearing to contest them.51
Three years later, in Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital,52
the supreme court cited Ascherman with approval. It held that a physi-
cian may neither be refused admission to, nor expelled from, the staff
of a hospital, unless the institution followed minimum common law
requirements of procedural due process. 53 Fair procedure must be ac-
corded in public and private hospitals alike. 54 The Anton court also
43. Id. at 259 n.7.
44. 460 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1969) [hereinafter Pinsker I].
45. Pinsker II, 526 P.2d 253.
46. Id. at 262.
47. Id. at 264 n.13.
48. Id. at 263.
49. Id. at 263-64.
50. 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App. 1974).
51. Id. at 696.
52. 567 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Cal. 1977).
53. See id. at 1168.
54. See id. at 1168 n.12.
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discussed the fair procedure process. Borrowing from Pinsker II and
fair procedure opinions in other contexts, it favored a flexible ap-
proach, refusing to establish rigid rules to be applied in all cases. The
court gave hospitals the discretion to formalize their own procedures,
but stated that the courts would step in if hospitals abused their
discretion. 55
The California Supreme Court also examined the substantive side
of fair procedure in medical staff decisions. In Miller v. Eisenhower Med-
ical Center,56 a hospital rejected an applicant for staff membership and
privileges based on a bylaw requiring the applicant to demonstrate his
ability to work with others. The physician challenged his exclusion,
arguing that the bylaw was so vague and uncertain that it created the
danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Although the
court agreed that exclusion may not be based on arbitrary or irra-
tional criteria,5 7 it found that the bylaw in question was valid because
the ability to work with others affects the quality of patient care. 58
Miller and Anton established the parameters of the substantive
and procedural requirements of common law fair procedure in hospi-
tal credentialing decisions. These decisions set broad guidelines, but
left many specific questions unanswered. In subsequent years, the ap-
pellate courts issued numerous opinions fleshing out the meaning of
fair procedure, both substantive and procedural. These cases are ex-
amined in the following sections.
A. The Substantive Component of Fair Procedure
The Miller court held that standards for admission to medical staff
membership or privileges may not "permit exclusion on an arbitrary
or irrational basis."'59 There must be a nexus between hospital require-
ments and established professional standards. Hospital standards must
be rationally based. A review of the case law shows that the appellate
courts have been very reluctant to find hospital standards irrational.
In most instances, the courts have accorded great deference to the
judgment of the medical profession. 60
55. See id. at 1178.
56. 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980).
57. Id. at 265.
58. Id. at 266-67.
59. Id. at 265.
60. See generally Gill v. Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1988); see also Cipri-
otti v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Ct. App.
1983).
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The appellate cases challenging hospital decisions on the basis of
irrational standards can be grouped into two broad categories. The
first category involves the situation where a physician's application was
rejected or she was disciplined for reasons not directly related to med-
ical competence, such as personality traits, criminal activity, or dishon-
esty. The second is where the aggrieved physician claims that the
institution's medical standards for admission or privileges were unrea-
sonable. Neither argument has been very successful.
The first group of cases concerns physicians who were denied ad-
mission or were disciplined because they could not work well with
others. On one hand, hospitals claim the right to exclude obstreper-
ous doctors whose personal characteristics may interfere with patient
care. On the other hand, the affected doctors argue that when hospi-
tal authorities exclude a doctor because of claims that she cannot "get
along with others" or is "disruptive," their assertions often mask the
authorities' sinister purposes. These may include carrying out their
personal animosities, stifling economic competition, punishing whis-
tle blowers, or perpetuating ethnic and racial discrimination.
The appellate courts initially struggled in deciding the point at
which exclusion of a doctor, based of the doctor's personal traits, be-
comes arbitrary. In Rosner v. Eden Township Hospital District,61 a district
hospital rejected a physician's application for medical staff member-
ship because he was not temperamentally suitable for hospital staff
practice, as he could not "get along" with others.62 Noting that the
applicant had a track record of criticizing the quality of patient care at
other hospitals, the court held that "[c]onsiderations of harmony in
the hospital must give way where the welfare of patients is involved,
and a physician by making his objections known, whether or not tact-
fully done, should not be required to risk his right to practice
medicine." 63 Otherwise, the requirement of temperamental suitability
could be "a subterfuge" for decisions not based on fitness qualifica-
tions.64 A subsequent supreme court case limited Rosner to local dis-
trict hospitals because the decision turned on a statute that
established qualifications for physicians at such institutions.65
61. 375 P.2d 431 (Cal. 1962). Rosner involved a doctor who applied for privileges at a
public hospital.
62. Id. at 432.
63. Id. at 435.
64. Id.
65. Miller v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 614 P.2d 258, 266 n.14 (Cal. 1980).
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As stated earlier, the supreme court addressed personal charac-
teristics as a standard for private hospital medical staff membership in
Miller. At issue was a bylaw focusing on the physician's "ability to work
with others. '66 The court noted that this bylaw was different from the
provision at issue in Rosner, where the doctor had been required to be
able to "get along" with others.67 It found that the bylaw was not sub-
stantively irrational because the ability to work with others can affect
patient care. The Miller court asserted that to ensure that bylaws are
not used as a subterfuge for rejecting otherwise qualified applicants,
the hospital must show that the physician's inability to work with
others presents "a real and substantial danger that patients treated by
him might receive other than a 'high quality of medical care' at the
facility if he were admitted to membership."68 The fact that the doctor
has an annoying personality is not enough in itself to exclude him
from staff membership. The hospital must present evidence of "a
more concrete and specific nature" to establish the nexus between the
physician's personality and its negative effect on patient care.69
Miller's message to hospital authorities is that it is proper to ex-
clude members based on personal traits if the characteristics are detri-
mental to patient care. Subsequent appellate court cases show that
hospitals have been able to establish this necessary connection. In Pick
v. Santa Ana-Tustin Community Hospital,70 the hospital produced evi-
dence that an applicant had engaged in "disruptive conduct" at other
institutions. 71 The court of appeal held that the doctor failed to meet
the burden of proving he was qualified for medical staff member-
ship.72 Courts have also sanctioned the dismissal of a doctor from a
residency program 73 and the suspension of the privileges of another,7 4
where the decisions were based on personality characteristics that
might affect patient care. As one court put it, "we are in no position to
undermine the opinion of the judicial review committee concerning
the appropriateness of appellant's conduct at the Hospital. Hospitals
66. Id. at 266.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 267.
69. Id. at 269.
70. 182 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Ct. App. 1982).
71. Id. at 93.
72. Id. at 94.
73. Marmion v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 193 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1983) (involv-
ing resident who was expelled for poor communication, poor attendance, poor consulta-
tion, and his adverse effect on morale).
74. Cipriotti v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367
(Ct. App. 1983).
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are usually in a unique position to police themselves. '75 Other per-
sonal deficiencies, including conviction of a felony76 and dishonesty, 77
have also been held to be grounds for disciplinary action.
Medical staffs also must establish medical standards for member-
ship and clinical privileges. Hospitals require applicants to establish
that their patients will receive "quality medical care' '78 Requests for
clinical privileges are evaluated based on the physician's "education,
training, experience, current demonstrated professional competence
and judgment, clinical performance, current health status, and the
documented results of patient care and other quality review and moni-
toring which the medical staff deems appropriate." 79 The meaning of
terms like "quality medical care" and acceptable "education," "train-
ing," and "experience" are inherently ambiguous and open to
interpretation.
In general, the appellate courts have given hospitals great leeway
to set their own medical standards. They have held that a hospital may
establish more stringent standards than those followed at other insti-
tutions. The award of clinical privileges is hospital-specific; so long as
there is a rational basis for the medical staff's requirements for clinical
privileges, a hospital may make them as stringent as it deems reasona-
bly necessary to assure adequate patient care.80 Thus, a physician may
qualify for membership or privileges at one hospital and may not qual-
ify for them at another.
Physicians have resorted to the courts to challenge medical staff
requirements that they claim are arbitrary. They have had some suc-
cess regarding requirements that are facially exclusionary. In As-
cherman,81 for example, a physician challenged a bylaw requiring an
applicant for medical staff membership to obtain three letters of refer-
75. Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dirs. of St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244
(Ct. App. 1985).
76. See Miller v. Nat'l Med. Hosp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Ct. App. 1981) (concerning the
suspension of a physician's privileges after he was convicted for conspiracy to murder his
wife, based on hospital's finding that his continued membership would disrupt the
hospital).
77. See Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 656 P.2d 554 (Cal. 1983) (finding that false-
hood on an application for medical staff privileges is good cause for denial of privileges);
Oskooi v. Fountain Valley Reg'l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that omission of information requested on an application is grounds for
suspension).
78. See BYLAws, supra note 35, art. II, § 2.2-1 (a).
79. Id. art. V, § 5.2-2.
80. See Bonner v. Sisters of Providence Corp., 239 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (Ct. App. 1987).
81. 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Ct. App. 1975).
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ence from current members. The court found that the bylaw was not
substantially rational.
[It had] the inherent grave danger that members of the active staff
may seek to exclude certain applicants because they are of a cer-
tain race, religion, ancestry, because they have testified against
them in malpractice suits, . . .simply because they do not like
themi[, or because the applicants do not] know three members of
the staff of a particular hospital .... 82
However, the great weight of authority maintains that hospitals
have wide latitude in setting requirements for physicians at their insti-
tutions. The courts generally defer to the judgment of hospital author-
ities when resolving these cases because "[c] ourts are ill-equipped to
assess the judgment of qualified physicians on matters requiring ad-
vanced study and extensive training in medical specialties. '8 3 This dis-
cretion afforded to hospitals has been solidified through case law.
Exclusion or discipline is proper when a physician violates specific
medical staff rules. For example, it is appropriate to deny membership
to an applicant who has not met the burden of establishing his qualifi-
cations as required by the medical staff bylaws.84 A physician may be
denied medical staff privileges for failing to cooperate in obtaining
information concerning his performance at another hospital, as re-
quired by the bylaws.85 A physician who fails to attend mandatory
meetings or to keep mandatory patient histories and progress reports
may be suspended.8 6 Failure to provide proof of liability insurance, as
required by the hospital, is grounds for suspending privileges.8 7 Disci-
plinary action is appropriate when a doctor has a substance abuse
problem. 88 Furthermore, a hospital may remove a physician from its
emergency room call panel for abandoning a patient and violating
COBRA.8 9
82. Id. at 511.
83. Bonner, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
84. Pick v. Santa Ana-Tustin Cmty. Hosp., 182 Cal. Rptr. 85, 94 (Ct. App. 1982).
85. See Webman v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 97 (Ct. App. 1995); see
also O'Byrne v. Santa Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (Ct. App. 2001).
86. See Cipriotti v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr.
367, 368 (Ct. App. 1983).
87. See Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 73 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 695, 706 (Ct. App. 1998). California law authorizes health facilities to require
every member of the medical staff to have professional liability insurance as a condition of
membership. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1319 (West 2000). The statute's constitution-
ality was upheld in Wilkinson v. Madera Community Hospital, 192 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Ct. App.
1983).
88. See Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1998).
89. See Hongsathavi, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
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The more controversial cases are those in which the medical staff
denies membership or privileges to an otherwise competent physician
who does not measure up to its elevated standards for providing qual-
ity medical care. These decisions are upsetting to physicians who enjoy
privileges at other institutions and do not have a history of medical
negligence or discipline. In these cases, the courts have favored the
hospitals. The fact that the physician is licensed to practice medicine
does not mean that she has the right to be admitted at any hospital.
The doctor's license ... does not determine qualification for hos-
pital privileges or establish competence to engage in specialties in
the hospital .... The determination of the standards to be applied
in granting privileges involves a legislative judgment, and just as
courts have largely deferred to administrative expertise in deter-
mining whether an applicant is qualified to practice a profession in
the first instance, they should defer to administrative expertise in
determining whether the professional is qualified to take on the
additional responsibilities involved in a grant of hospital
privileges.
90
An appellate court found that requiring a surgeon to complete a
residency program as a condition to receiving a clinical privilege, even
where a "grandfather clause" allowed for other doctors to have the
privilege without such training, was not unreasonable or arbitrary.9 1
Because clinical privileges are hospital specific, a hospital may make
its requirements as stringent as it deems reasonably necessary to as-
sure adequate patient care.9 2
B. Fair Procedure Process Requirements
Under common law precedent, a physician's procedural rights,
when contesting an adverse medical staff decision, are rudimentary, as
the courts give hospitals a free hand to devise their own procedures.
COBRA is the acronym for the federal Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1986, . . . which is also referred to as the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act... [42 U.S.C. § 1395dd]. COBRA was enacted to
prevent 'dumping,' the refusal to treat indigent patients in medical emergencies
.... Congress intended that patients with emergency medical conditions receive
proper medical care for their emergency conditions, regardless of their financial
resources.
Id. at 699 n.3.
90. Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 656 P.2d 554, 562-63 (Cal. 1983) (citations
omitted).
91. Smith v. Vallejo Gen. Hosp., 216 Cal. Rptr. 189, 193 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Oliver
v. Bd. of Trs. of Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 227 Cal. Rptr. I (Ct. App. 1986) (regarding a physi-
cian who was denied membership to consulting staff because there was no evidence that he
was nationally or internationally renowned in his area of specialty).
92. Hay v. Scripps Mem'l Hosp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 413, 419 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Fair procedure does not mandate any "fixed format."93 So long as
some hearing is provided, a hospital is not "hampered by formali-
ties"94 and need not follow "formal proceedings with all the embellish-
ments of a court trial. 95
The case law establishes that a physician is entitled to notice of
the reasons for the decision and an opportunity to defend herself.96 If
the hospital's bylaws establish hearing procedures, then the institution
is bound to follow its own rules. 97 There must also be an opportunity
to confront and cross examine accusers and to examine and refute
evidence. 9
Furthermore, the physician is entitled to unbiased decision-mak-
ers99 and an unbiased hearing officer, if one has been appointed.100
However, bias is not presumed and the burden is on the physician to
establish the probability of unfairness. 01 Courts have held that bias
exists when persons who participated in an investigation served on the
panel that decided the case. t0 2 The physician must raise the bias issue
during the proceedings or it is waived. 10 3 Additionally, the doctor
must be afforded the opportunity to voir dire potential adjudicators to
uncover possible bias.' 0 4
Common law fair procedure does not entitle the physician to be
represented by an attorney during hearings at the hospital. 05 One
court expressed antipathy toward lawyers and discounted their impor-
tance to peer review hearings:
The purpose of the proceeding is to review highly technical docu-
ments and medical reports dealing with the doctors' performance
in an area where experts in the same field can arrive at a decision
without the controversial and contentious atmosphere which
93. Tiholiz v. Northridge Hosp. Found., 199 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (Ct. App. 1984).
94. Bollengier v. Doctors Med. Ctr., 272 Cal. Rptr. 273, 280 (Ct. App. 1990).
95. Huang v. Bd. of Dirs., St. Francis Med. Ctr., 270 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46 (Ct. App. 1990).
96. See Pinsker I, 562 P.2d 253, 263 (Cal. 1974); Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247
Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Ct. App. 1988).
97. See generally Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Mem'l Hosp., 167 Cal. Rptr. 610
(Ct. App. 1980).
98. See Hackethal v. Cal. Med. Ass'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (Ct. App. 1982).
99. See Applebaum v. Bd. of Dirs. of Barton Mem'l Hosp., 163 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (Ct.
App. 1980).
100. See Gill v. Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304, 317 (Ct. App. 1988).
101. See Rhee, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
102. Applebaum, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
103. Anton v. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162, 1176-77 (Cal. 1977); Gaenslen
v. Bd. of Dirs. of St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 (Ct. App. 1985).
104. Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 827 (Ct. App. 1991); Lasko v.
Valley Presbyterian Hosp., 225 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608-09 (Ct. App. 1986).
105. Anton, 567 P.2d at 1176-77.
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would likely be created by the participation of attorneys. Medical
staff hearings involve highly educated individuals. There is little
risk that a physician will be erroneously deprived of staff privileges
if he is not allowed counsel at the hearing.10 6
Common law fair procedure does not require formal discovery, 10 7
but the physician is entitled to disclosure of the evidence forming the
basis of the charges and any information that would be made available
to the hearing panel. 10 8 Finally, the hospital must give the physician
the opportunity to make copies of medical records so she can prepare
her defense. 09
II. Formalization of the Peer Review Process Through
Legislation
As a result of legislation enacted in the late 1980s, peer review in
California hospitals has changed dramatically. The catalyst for the
change was the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986110 which, among other things, envisioned minimal due process
rights for those involved in the peer review process."' This legislation
permitted the states to opt out of the federal law so long as their plans
included certain basic procedural requirements. 1t2 The California leg-
islature exercised this option by enacting a series of laws that set forth
the procedures hospitals must, at a minimum, follow in certain peer
review proceedings. 1 13 These provisions, codified in sections 809
through 809.9 of the Business and Professions Code, became effective
on January 1, 1990.
Hospitals must now comply with specifically delineated formal
rules when peer review may result in the filing of a Section 805 re-
port.114 The law mandates that medical staffs incorporate the laws'
106. Gill v. Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304, 311 (Ct. App. 1988).
107. Id. at 315; Smith v. Vallejo Gen. Hosp., 216 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (Ct. App. 1985).
108. Hackethal v. Cal. Med. Ass'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1982).
109. Rosenblit, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000).
111. The federal notice and hearing requirements are found at id.
112. Id. § 1 1 I I I (c) (2) (B). The legislature declared it was opting out of the federal law
"because the laws of this state provide a more careful articulation of the protections for
both those undertaking peer review activity and those subject to review, and better inte-
grates public and private systems of peer review." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809 (a) (9) (A)
(West 2003).
113. The California Medical Association claims responsibility for the legislation, which
is codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE sections 809-809.9, and is referred to as "CMA's peer
review legislation." CAL. MED. Ass'N, 4 CALIFORNIA PHYSICIAN's LEGAL HANDBOOK 31:34
(2002).
114. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 809(a) (8), (b).
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provisions into their bylaws. " 5 Essentially, the legislature delegated re-
sponsibility for peer review to the private sector, with the caveat that
hospitals act in accordance with specific guidelines." 6 From a proce-
dural perspective, the legislation gives the physician many rights that
were not recognized by the courts under common law fair procedure.
The statute has subsumed or clarified other common law rules. The
new law was designed to set minimum procedural requirements for
peer review; it does not affect a hospital's right to set substantive stan-
dards for medical staff membership.
The legislation mandates that a hospital go through a number of
steps before reaching a final adverse credentialing decision based on a
medical disciplinary cause. 117 It envisions that the hospital will first
conduct informal investigations or pre-hearing meetings to determine
if disciplinary action is necessary. If the medical staff' 18 decides to pro-
ceed, it must give the physician a number of required notices. These
include written notice of the final proposed action which, if adopted,
will be reported pursuant to Section 805,119 the right to request a
hearing, 20 and the time limit within which to request a hearing. 2 1 If
the physician makes a timely hearing request, the hospital must give
written notice 122 stating the reasons for the decision, including the
acts or omissions with which she is charged, 123 and the time, place,
and date of the hearing.1 24
The legislation governs appointment of the fact finder and pre-
hearing procedures. The trier of fact must be an arbitrator or arbitra-
tors mutually acceptable to the physician and hospital or a panel of
115. Id. § 809(a)(8); Unnamed Physician v. Bd. of Trs. of St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 309, 320 (Ct. App. 2001).
116. Unnamed Physician, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
117. The law provides for the immediate suspension of privileges in emergency cases
"where the failure to take that action may result in an imminent danger to the health of
any individual." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.5. The hospital must subsequently give the
physician notice of the charges and of his or her right to a hearing. Id.
118. Throughout the law, the statute refers to the instigator of the peer review process
as the "peer review body." The medical staff is listed within the definition of peer review
body. Id. §§ 805(a) (1) (A), 809(b). In practice, the medical staff instigates most investiga-
tions. In rare cases where the medical staff fails to investigate or institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings, the hospital's governing board has authority to require the medical staff to
initiate an investigation or a disciplinary action. Id. § 809.05(b).
119. Id. §§ 809.1(b)(1)-(2).
120. Id. § 809.1 (b) (3).
121. Id. § 809.1(b) (4).
122. Id. § 809.1(c).
123. Id. § 809.1(c)(1).
124. Id. § 809.1(c) (2).
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unbiased individuals who shall gain no direct benefit from the out-
come and who have not acted as an accuser, fact finder, or initial deci-
sion maker in the same matter. 125 When feasible, an individual
practicing the same specialty as the doctor should be a member of the
peer review body.126 If a hearing officer is selected to preside over the
hearing, the individual may gain no direct financial benefit from the
outcome, may not act as the prosecutor, and cannot vote. 127 The doc-
tor must be given a reasonable opportunity to voir dire panel mem-
bers and the hearing officer to uncover possible bias.1 28 Challenges to
the impartiality of any member or hearing officer are ruled on by the
presiding officer or hearing officer. 129
The law provides for a limited type of informal discovery. Each
side has the right to inspect and copy relevant documentary informa-
tion in the other's possession, subject to confidentiality limitations. 130
Upon request, each side must provide the other with a witness list and
copies of documents expected to be introduced at the hearing.' 3 ' The
law details the time within which the hearing must be held and the
procedure for granting continuances. 13 2
The legislation also describes how the hearing will proceed and
sets the burdens of proof. Both sides have a right to all information
made available to the trier of fact,133 to have a record made of the
proceedings, 134 to call, examine, and cross examine witnesses,1 35 to
present and rebut relevant evidence, 136 and to submit a written state-
ment at the close of the hearing. 137 The medical staff has the initial
duty to present evidence supporting the charge or recommended ac-
tion. 138 Initial applicants have the burden of proving, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that they are qualified for membership or
privileges. The applicant may not introduce evidence that had been
requested by the medical staff during the application process but
125. Id. § 809.2(a).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 809.2(b).
128. Id. § 809.2(c).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 809.2(d).
131. Id. § 809.2(f).
132. Id. §§ 809.2(g)-(h).
133. Id. § 809.3(a)(1).
134. Id. § 809.3(a) (2).
135. Id. § 809.3(a) (3).
136. Id. § 809(a) (4).
137. Id. § 809(a)(5).
138. Id. § 809.3(b)(1).
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which the applicant did not provide, unless the applicant establishes
that the information could not have been produced previously in the
exercise of reasonable diligence.1 39 For those other than initial appli-
cants, the medical staff must prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the action or recommendation is reasonable and
warranted. 40 Whether the physician has the right to counsel at the
hearing is left to the judgment of the medical staff, but the staff must
have written provisions setting out its preference. 141
The trier of fact must issue a written decision, including findings
of fact and a conclusion, articulating the connection between the evi-
dence produced at the hearing and the decision. 142 If the hospital's
rules authorize an appeal, both sides must be notified of the right and
can appear before the appellate body.1 43 Both have the right to be
represented by an attorney or any other representative during the ap-
peal. 144 The parties are entitled to a written decision from the appel-
late body.145
The law also recognizes that a hospital may confer rights that go
beyond those required by the legislature. "The parties are bound by
any additional notice and hearing provisions contained in any applica-
ble .. .medical staff bylaws which are not inconsistent with Sections
809.1 to 809.4, inclusive."'146 It is illegal for a hospital to attempt to
waive any of the legislative requirements.' 47
The legislation is binding on most hospitals in the state. The only
exempt institutions are state and county hospitals, those operated by
the Regents of the University of California, health facilities that serve
as the primary teaching facilities for state-approved medical schools,
or hospitals engaged in postgraduate medical education under the
auspices of a state approved medical school. 148
Section 809.8 codifies that judicial review is available by way of
administrative mandamus pursuant to California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, section 1094.5.149 The statutory scheme allows a prevailing party
139. Id. § 809.3(b)(2).
140. Id. § 809.3(b) (3).
141. Id. § 809.3(c).
142. Id. §809.4(a)(1).
143. Id. §§ 809.4(a)(2), (b)(1).
144. Id. § 809.4(b)(2).
145. Id. § 809.4(b) (3).
146. Id. § 809.6(a).
147. Id. § 809.6(c).
148. Id. § 809.7.
149. Id. § 809.8.
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to recover court costs and attorney fees when a party brings or de-
fends a lawsuit that was "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation,
or in bad faith." 150
III. Medical Staff Bylaws and the Peer Review Process:
The California Medical Association Model
Bylaws Example
The process that a hospital follows in peer review today also de-
pends to a great extent on the institution's medical staff bylaws. Cali-
fornia law requires a medical staff to adopt bylaws that include the
procedure for evaluating applicants, granting privileges, and disciplin-
ing members. 1 51 The medical staff must follow the bylaws when con-
ducting peer review, as they govern the parties' administrative
rights.1 52 The legislature's intent in enacting the Business and Profes-
sions Code sections governing peer review was to set minimum proce-
dural rights.' 5 3 When medical staff bylaws confer rights beyond those
mandated by the law, they are binding. 154
To illustrate how medical staff bylaws can affect the peer review
process, the article will use, as an example, the procedures outlined in
the California Medical Association's Annotated Model Medical Staff
Bylaws ("CMA Model Bylaws"). The California Medical Association is a
statewide organization representing the interests of its over 30,000
members. For many years, it has taken a very active role in advising
medical staffs embarking on the task of creating or revising medical
staff bylaws. The CMA sponsors a Bylaw Analysis Service, whereby an
attorney assists medical staffs with bylaws issues.1 55 According to a
CMA publication, the Bylaw Analysis Service "is physician and medical
staff oriented and is designed to highlight and protect important
rights."1 56 The CMA has also drafted the CMA Model Bylaws for use in
California hospitals.' 57 The CMA Model Bylaws are "physician-
150. Id.
151. See supra note 4; see also Oliver v. Bd. of Trs. of Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 227 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 2 (Ct. App. 1986).
152. Unnamed Physician v. Bd. of Trs. of St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309,
316 (Ct. App. 2001).
153. Id. at 320.
154. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.6(a) provides: "The parties are bound by any addi-
tional notice and hearing provisions contained in any applicable professional society or
medical staff bylaws which are not inconsistent with Sections 809.1 to 809.4, inclusive."
155. See CAL. MED. ASS'N, 3 CALIFORNIA PHYsicIAN's LEGAL HANDBOOK 28:1 (2002).
156. Id.
157. The CMA has drafted separate model bylaws for departmental and nondepart-
mental hospitals. Id. at 28:1 n.1081; see also telephone interview with Elizabeth Snelson,
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friendly" because they include procedural protections beyond those
required by statute and case law.
Information showing the number of institutions using the CMA
Model Bylaws as the basis for their bylaws was not available when this
article was written. 158 Each hospital's medical staff adopts its own by-
laws, and there is no central collection point for this information. Nev-
ertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the CMA Model
Bylaws-at least so far as they relate to peer review-are widely used in
California hospitals. First, the CMA Model Bylaws are prepared by the
largest physician advocacy group in the state. It makes sense that med-
ical staffs comprised of physicians would consider and follow physi-
cian-friendly recommendations of their own advocacy group. Second,
the CMA actively promotes the Model Bylaws and the Bylaw Analysis
Service on its website and in its publications. It provides the Model
Bylaws to members of the CMA Organized Medical Staff Section at no
charge, and it assesses only nominal fees for the Bylaw Analysis Ser-
vice. 15 9 Third, many appellate court opinions involving medical staff
bylaws and credentialing decisions show that the bylaws were based on
the CMA Model Bylaws. In some cases, the courts specifically mention
the nexus, 160 while in others, the bylaw text mirrors current or former
versions of the CMA Model Bylaws.1 61
Bylaw Analyst, California Medical Association (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Snelson inter-
view]. Peer review protections are similar under both plans. Snelson interview. Because most
California hospitals are departmentalized, the article will focus on the model bylaws for use
at these institutions.
158. CMA's bylaw analyst, Elizabeth Snelson, Esq., stated that she is unaware whether
the CMA collects data relating to the use of the Model Bylaws. She confirmed that, as bylaw
analyst, she recommends medical staffs base their peer review rules on the CMA provisions.
Id. In response to an email inquiry about the use of the CMA Model Bylaws in the state, a
CMA official replied: "[M]ost hospitals use the model by-laws to some degree or another
(some in total, others adopting sections of it)." E-mail from Robin Flagg Strimling, Associ-
ate Director, Government Programs and Medical Staff Section, Center for Medical and
Regulatory Policy Economics, California Medical Association, to the author (Aug. 15,
2003) (on file with author).
159. See CAL. MED. ASS'N, THE CMA BOOKSTORE, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAvs-HARD
Copy (2003), available at http://www.cmanet.org/bookstore/product.cfm?catid=3&pro
ductid=168 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2003); see also CAL. MED. ASS'N, THE CMA BOOKSTORE,
MEDICAL STAFF BYLAW ANALYSIS SERVICE (2003), available at http://www.cmanet.org/book
store/product.cfm?productid=52 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2003).
160. See, e.g., Anton v. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Cal. 1977);
Smith v. Vallejo Gen. Hosp., 216 Cal. Rptr. 189, 193 (Ct. App. 1985).
161. See, e.g., Unnamed Physician v. Bd. of Trs. of St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d
309, 314 (Ct. App. 2001);Joel v. Valley Surgical Ctr., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247, 248 (Ct. App.
1998); Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 254 (Ct. App. 1988); Cipriotti v.
Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367, 370-71 (CL App.
1983).
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The following subsections describe the basic peer review process
under the CMA Model Bylaws, placing special emphasis on procedu-
ral requirements beyond those required by statute.
A. Overview of the Steps Leading to a Judicial Review Committee
Hearing Under the CMA Model Bylaws
The CMA Model Bylaws set the framework whereby the medical
staff makes credentialing decisions regarding members and appli-
cants-decisions that may trigger the right to a judicial review com-
mittee ('JRC") hearing. 162 They govern applications for medical staff
membership, as well as set rules for reapplications, requests for addi-
tional clinical privileges, and discipline of existing members. The deci-
sion-making process is based on a committee system, whereby matters
are considered and decided by a number of committees in the hospi-
tal's chain of authority.
The most powerful group within the medical staff hierarchy is the
medical executive committee ("MEC"). In a departmentalized hospi-
tal, the MEC consists of a number of individuals, including elected
officers (the chief of staff, the vice chief of staff, and secretary trea-
surer), 163 department chairs, and elected at-large medical staff mem-
bers. 164 The MEC is the governing body of the medical staff.165
The CMA Model Bylaws envision that the medical staff will be
organized into clinical departments reflecting specialty areas of prac-
tice, such as surgery or cardiology. When a physician applies for medi-
cal staff membership, the application is sent to the appropriate
committee for consideration. In the case of applicants, the depart-
ment has the discretion to conduct a personal interview.166 The de-
partment makes a recommendation as to appointment and, if the
recommendation is positive, membership category, department affilia-
tion, clinical privileges, and any special conditions to be attached. 167
The recommendation is forwarded to the credentials committee,168
which conducts its own review.
162. The peer review hearing is referred to as the 'judicial review committee hearing"
throughout the bylaws. BYLAws, supra note 35.
163. The qualifications, election process, and terms of these officers are found at id.,
art. IX.
164. See id. art. XI, § 11.3-1.
165. Id. art. I, § 1.2-9.
166. Id. art. IV, § 4.5-4.
167. See id.
168. Credentials committee members are appointed by the chief of staff, in consulta-
tion with the MEC. See id. art. IX, § 9.2-1(f).
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The credentials committee may elect to interview the applicant
and seek additional information.1 69 Once its review is complete, the
credentials committee submits a written report and recommendation
to the MEG. The MEC may request additional information or it may
return the matter to the credentials committee. It also has the option
of interviewing the applicant. When the review has been completed,
the MEC sets forth its decision, in writing. 170 If it is favorable, the deci-
sion is sent to the hospital governing board for approval. If it is ad-
verse, the MEC must give written notice to the applicant, informing
her that she is entitled to aJRC hearing.171 The process is very similar
when an existing member applies for reappointment or for a modifi-
cation of staff status or clinical privileges.' 72
A different procedure is followed when the medical staff wishes to
take disciplinary or "corrective action" against a member. 17 3 A request
for investigation can be instituted by the chief of staff, a department
chair, or the MEC, through the filing of a written request to the
MEC. 174 If the MEC concludes that an investigation is warranted, it
may direct that one be undertaken. The MEC may conduct the investi-
gation itself or refer the matter to a medical staff officer, department,
or standing or ad hoc committee of the medical staff. The member
must be notified of the investigation and be given an opportunity to
provide information.' 7 5 If the MEC selects an officer or committee to
conduct the investigation, the officer or committee must generate a
written report regarding its findings. 176
The MEC then makes its determination. If it decides corrective
action is warranted, the MEC sends the recommendation to the hospi-
tal's governing board.17 7 The board must adopt the MEC's recom-
mendation if it is supported by substantial evidence. If the board
approves the recommendation, the member has the right to a JRC
hearing to contest the decision.178
169. Id. art. IV, § 4.5-5.
170. See id. art. IV, § 4.5-6.
171. See id. art. IV, § 4.5-7.
172. See generally id. art. IV, § 4.6-3.
173. See generally id. art. VI, § 6.1.
174. See id. art. VI, §§ 6.1-1, 6.1-2.
175. See id. art. VI, § 6.1-3.
176. See id.
177. See id. art. VI, § 6.1-5(a).
178. See id. art. VI, § 6.1-5(b).
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B. Grounds for a JRC Hearing Under the CMA Model Bylaws
The CMA Model Bylaws entitle an applicant or member to a JRC
hearing in many situations not covered by the statutory mandates.
Under section 809.1 (a) of the Business and Professions Code, a physi-
cian is entitled to notice and a hearing when the proposed action "is
required to be filed under Section 805 . . . ." A hospital is required to
file a Section 805 report only if a decision is based on "a medical disci-
plinary cause or reason."1 79 A medical disciplinary cause or reason is
defined as "that aspect of a licentiate's competence or professional
conduct which is reasonably likely to be detrimental to patient safety
or to the delivery of patient care." 180 In other words, a physician only
has a right to a hearing under the statute when her conduct imperils
patient safety.
The CMA Model Bylaws provide the right to a hearing for a wide
range of potential adverse actions, including the following: denial of
medical staff membership; denial of requested advancement in staff
membership status or category; denial of medical staff reappointment;
demotion to lower medical staff category or membership; suspension
of staff membership; revocation of staff membership; denial of re-
quested clinical privileges; involuntary reduction of current clinical
privileges; suspension of clinical privileges; termination of all clinical
privileges; or involuntary imposition of significant consultation or
monitoring requirements. 18 1 Thus, a physician who may not pose a
threat to patient safety, but who does not meet the institution's stan-
dards for admission, advancement, or clinical privileges, has the right
to a hearing under the CMA Model Bylaws.
C. Selection of the JRC and the Hearing Officer
The MEC has broad power to select the fact finders and hearing
officer for the JRC hearing. The MEC must recommend to the hospi-
tal's governing board no fewer than five members of the active medi-
cal staff to serve as a JRC. Membership must consist of one member
who has the same healing arts licensure as the accused, and where
feasible, include an individual practicing the accused's same specialty.
If it is not feasible to appoint members from the active medical staff,
the MEC may appoint practitioners from other staff categories or non-
179. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 805(b)(I)-(3) (West 2003).
180. Id. §805(a)(6).
181. BYLAws, supra note 35, art. VII, §§ 7.2(a)-(k).
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members. The recommended members are deemed acceptable unless
the board objects within five days. 182
The MEC also recommends a hearing officer to the governing
board. The governing board is deemed to have approved the selection
unless it files a written objection within five days of the recommenda-
tion. The hearing officer may be an attorney at law, but an attorney
from a firm regularly utilized by the hospital, the medical staff, or the
involved medical staff member or applicant, for legal advice regarding
their affairs and activities is not qualified to serve.' 83 In addition to
presiding over the hearing, the hearing officer, if requested by the
JRC, may participate in deliberations of the committee and be a legal
advisor to it. However, the hearing officer is not entitled to vote. 184
D. Conduct of the JRC Hearing
The CMA Model Bylaws give the hearing officer authority to con-
trol the conduct of the hearing, including the admission and exclu-
sion of evidence.185 A court reporter transcribes the proceedings at
the hospital's expense. 186 The physician is entitled to representation
by legal counsel in any phase of the hearing. The MEC may not be
represented by an attorney if the physician is not similarly repre-
sented. 187 The parties have the right to present witnesses, cross ex-
amine witnesses, and introduce documentary evidence. 88 Judicial
rules of evidence and procedure do not apply and hearsay evidence is
admissible "if it is of the sort of evidence on which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs."189 The bur-
dens of presenting evidence and proof conform to the requirements
of the relevant Business and Professions Code section. 90
E. Decision and Right of Appeal to the Governing Board
Under the CMA Model Bylaws, the JRC must issue a written deci-
sion within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing and deliver
copies of it to the MEC, the hospital administrator, the governing
board, and the physician. The decision must contain a concise state-
182. Id. art. VII, § 7.3-5.
183. Id. art. VII, § 7.4-3.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See id. art. VII, § 7.4-4.
187. Id. art. VII, § 7.4-2.
188. See id. art. VII, § 7.4-5.
189. Id. art. VII, § 7.4-6.
190. See generally id. art. VII, § 7.4-7.
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ment of the reasons underlying it, including findings of fact and a
conclusion articulating the connection between the evidence
presented and the conclusion. If the decision is of the type that must
be reported to the Medical Board, it must so state. Both the MEC and
the physician must be notified of the ight to appeal.191
The MEC or the physician may appeal theJRC decision by filing a
written request for review within ten days of receipt of the decision.1 92
The request must specify the grounds for appeal and must include a
supporting statement of facts. The grounds for governing board re-
view are very narrow. The first ground is that substantial noncompli-
ance with the procedures required by the bylaws or applicable law has
created demonstrable prejudice. The second is that the decision was
not supported by the substantial evidence, based upon the hearing
record 193 or the discovery of new evidence. The third is that the text
of the report to be filed with the Medical Board and/or National Prac-
titioner Data Bank is not accurate.' 94
The governing board may hear the appeal, or designate an ap-
peal board of no fewer than three of its members, to undertake this
responsibility. Knowledge of the matter does not preclude any person
from serving on the appeal board, so long as the person did not take
part in a prior hearing on the same matter.195 The bylaws prescribe
the time within which the hearing must be held. 196 Each party has the
right to be represented by legal counsel, may submit a written state-
ment, and may personally appear and make oral argument.197 The
appeal board then makes a recommendation to the full governing
board, which may affirm, modify, or reverse the JRC decision, or re-
mand the case for further review and decision. 198 The governing
board must issue a written decision and include the text of any report
that will be made to state and federal authorities.1 99
At this point, the hospital peer review process is finished and the
parties have exhausted their administrative remedies. A party dissatis-
191. Id. art. VII, § 7.4-10.
192. Id. art. VII, § 7.5-1. This bylaw does not specify to whom the request must be
made, but context shows that it is to the governing board.
193. The governing body may not reweigh the evidence and exercise its independent
judgment when reviewing the JRC decision. Huang v. Bd. of Dirs., St. Francis Med. Ctr.,
270 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45-46 (Ct. App. 1990).
194. BYLAws, supra note 35, art. VII, § 7.5-2.
195. Id. art. VII, § 7.5-4.
196. See generally id. art. VII, § 7.5-3.
197. Id. art. VII, § 7.5-5.
198. See id.
199. See id. art. VII, § 7.5-6(c).
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fled with the decision may seek judicial review in the superior court
through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, pursuant to
California's Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5. In this event, the
superior court reviews the decision of the governing board, not that of
the JRC, because the governing board's ruling is the "final administra-
tive order or decision" referred to in the statute. 20 0
IV. Peer Review Today: Shortcomings, Solutions, and
Concerns
The additions to the Business and Professions Code have made
peer review a much more formalized process than it was under the
common law fair procedure rules. Today's law is based on settled fair
procedure requirements, which include the right to notice of charges
and an opportunity to be heard before unbiased decision-makers.
However, the current law goes well beyond these rudimentary rights
by requiring specific written notices and decisions, providing the op-
portunity for informal discovery, setting burdens of proof, and al-
lowing for the possibility of legal representation at peer review
proceedings. The result is that peer review is more predictable and
fair for the physician.
In addition, as the analysis of the CMA Model Bylaws reveals, hos-
pital medical staffs, through their bylaws, often go beyond the mini-
mum legislative requirements, by granting additional rights and
standardizing the process. From a procedural perspective, the physi-
cian is in a better position to fully present her case than she was under
the judicial precedents. It is important to recognize that the legislative
changes do not bear on the substantive side of common law fair pro-
cedure. Thus, the fair procedure precedents relating to qualifications
for medical staff membership retain their importance, and the judicial
policy of deferring to the decisions of health care professionals, unless
the decisions lack a rational basis, remains intact.
Although the current peer review process is fairer to the individ-
ual physician, some problems remain. The following subsections will
address these issues. The first is whether the statutes and bylaws give
hospital authorities too much power to control peer review hearings.
The second problem, which is closely related to the first, concerns the
lack of any meaningful opportunity forjudicial review of hospital deci-
sions. The article concludes with thoughts on whether formalized
200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (West Supp. 2003); Hongsathavij v. Queen of
Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695, 702 (Ct. App. 1998).
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peer review has become so cumbersome and expensive that hospitals
may be discouraged from instituting formal investigations.
A. Leveling the Playing Field in Peer Review
When medical staff authorities make an adverse credentialing de-
cision that triggers the physician's right to a peer review hearing, the
relationship between the staff and the affected member or applicant
becomes adversarial. The earlier examination of the CMA Model By-
laws establishes this point. After department and credential commit-
tee review, the MEC makes the final decision on credentialing. With
respect to an applicant, the MEC decides if the physician meets the
medical staff's minimum qualifications and it makes a written report
supporting the decision. 20 1 The MEC also makes written decisions in-
volving the discipline of staff members or limits on privileges. 20 2 Thus,
the MEC has reviewed the evidence and taken a stand, and the physi-
cian who requests a hearing is attacking the conclusions of the MEC.
At the peer review hearing, the MEC takes on the role of prosecu-
tor for the medical staff. The chief of staff, who is responsible for en-
forcing the bylaws and implementing sanctions, 203 is the MEC's
representative. Because the Business and Professions Code and CMA
Model Bylaws place the burden of proof on the MEC in most in-
stances, the hearing is a forum where the MEC must justify and de-
fend its decision, while the doctor tries to prove that the MEC was
wrong.
Because the MEC and the doctor are adversaries at the JRC hear-
ing, neither party should have an advantage. Still, the Business and
Professions Code and the CMA Model Bylaws give the MEC far too
much control over important hearing decisions, thereby creating the
danger of unfairness. The first potential for bias under the CMA
Model Bylaws lies in that the MEC selects the members of the JRC. 20 4
This task falls to the chief of staff, in consultation with the MEC. 20 5
The MEC recommends panel members to the governing body, which
is deemed to approve the selections unless it objects in writing within
five days.20 6 This process has great potential for abuse. The MEC has a
free hand to appoint members who are friendly to the administration
201. See generally BYLAWS, supra note 35, art. IV, § 4.5-6.
202. See generally id. art. VI, § 6.1-5(a).
203. Id. art. IX, § 9.2-1(a).
204. See id. art. VII, § 7.3-5.
205. See id. art. IX, § 9.2-1(f).
206. See id. art. VII, §§ 7.3-1 n.90, 7.3-5.
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and to exclude those who are not.20 7 Arguably, the physician can un-
cover the impartiality of JRC appointees through voir dire,20 8 but this
is not a very meaningful right, especially for new applicants who may
not know the panel members. Even if the physician or her attorney is
adept at voir dire and asks probing questions, she may not uncover
reasons if would lead a JRC member to favor the MEC's position.
The danger of bias also surrounds the appointment of the hear-
ing officer. The hearing officer acts as the judge in JRC proceedings.
This individual (who is usually an attorney) rules on legal questions,
including the admissibility of evidence. Although the hearing officer
cannot vote, the JRC may invite the officer to "participate in [its] de-
liberations ... and be a legal advisor to it,"209 under the CMA Model
Bylaws. The MEC selects the hearing officer, subject to veto by the
governing body.210 If the MEC retains an attorney to act as the hear-
ing officer, the hospital pays the attorney's fee. The physician can
challenge the impartiality of the hearing officer, but the bylaws give
the hearing officer authority to rule on her own qualifications. 21 1 This
system, whereby the prosecutor has broad power to select the fact
finders and the judge for the JRC hearing, creates, at the very least,
the appearance of impropriety. It should come as no surprise that hos-
pital authorities appoint panel members and hearing officers who are
sympathetic to the hospital's position.
There are alternative approaches to the selection of fact finders
and hearing officers. These approaches would limit the power of the
MEC, thereby lessening the danger of bias. With respect to fact find-
ers, one alternative is to have an arbitrator or arbitrators who are mu-
tually acceptable to the medical staff and physician decide the case.
The Business and Professions Code specifically authorizes the use of
207. Although the rule prohibitsJRC members from having a "direct financial benefit
from the outcome" and excludes those who "acted as accusers, investigators, fact finders,
initial decision makers" or those who "actively participated in the consideration of the
matter leading up to the recommendation or action," id. art. VII, § 7.3-5, it does not ac-
count for the fact that the MEC may appoint "its people"-friends, professional colleagues,
doctors who are hospital employees, and those sympathetic to the MEC for other rea-
sons-to serve on the panel.
208. See id. art. VII, § 7.4-1 (e).
209. Id. art. VII, § 7.4-3.
210. See id. Attorneys from a firm regularly utilized by the hospital, the medical staff or
the involved medical staff member, or the applicant are not eligible to serve. Statute and
the bylaws also prohibit the hearing officer from gaining a direct financial benefit from the
outcome and must not act as prosecutor or advocate. Id.
211. See id. art.VII, § 7.4-1(e).
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arbitrators,2 12 and there is no limitation on individuals who can serve.
They could be medical staff members or nonmembers, although, as a
practical matter, a medical staff may be unwilling to leave final creden-
tialing decisions to outsiders.
A second alternative is to follow the CMA Model Bylaws approach
of using medical staff members as JRC fact finders, but to eliminate
the MEC's exclusive right to select them. JRC members could be cho-
sen randomly from a pool of medical staff members who are qualified
to serve under the Business and Professions Code guidelines. 2 13 A vari-
ation on this option is to have the MEC and the affected physician
join in on selecting the panel from the pool of qualified members,
similar to voir dire in a trial.
If the medical staff wishes to have a hearing officer preside atJRC
hearings, there are ways to ensure that the individual is truly neutral.
Rather than having the MEC choose the hearing officer, both sides
could participate in the selection. Private judging and arbitration ser-
vices would seem to be an ideal source of qualified hearing officers. In
the event that medical staffs resist sharing the power to appoint the
hearing officer, the officer's ability to affect outcomes should be
checked. The portion of the bylaws that allows the hearing officer to
advise the JRC and participate in its deliberations should be repealed.
The medical professionals on the JRC must decide the facts, and the
decision should be theirs alone. The hearing officer's neutrality is un-
dermined when the MEC-selected individual participates in JRC
deliberations.
B. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review of Peer Review
Decisions
After the peer review body makes its decision, the physician may
appeal the ruling to the hospital's governing board, if the bylaws pro-
vide for such an appeal. If the governing board affirms the decision,
or if the bylaws do not authorize board review, the decision is final
212. The hearing shall be held, as determined by the peer review body, before a
trier of fact, which shall be an arbitrator or arbitrators selected by a process mutu-
ally acceptable to the licentiate and the peer review body, or before a panel of
unbiased individuals who shall gain no direct financial benefit from the outcome,
who have not acted as an accuser, investigator, fact finder, or initial decision
maker in the same matter, and which shall include, where feasible, an individual
practicing the same specialty as the licentiate.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.2(a) (West 2003).
213. Id. If feasible, the pool would include members who practice in the same specialty
as the licentiate. Id.
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and the physician has exhausted her administrative remedies at the
hospital.2 14 The doctor can then challenge the decision in the
courts.
2 1 5
In Anton,216 the California Supreme Court held that section
1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs judicial review in peer
review cases.217 Because the hospital's finding is a final adjudicatory
decision 218 of an administrative agency, the aggrieved physician must
bring a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus to challenge
it.219 The court found that section 1094.5 review applies to private, as
well as public, hospital decisions. 220 Years later, when the legislature
codified the peer review process in the Business and Professions Code,
it recognized that administrative mandamus is the avenue for judicial
review.221 The reviewing court may grant the writ and command the
hospital to set aside the decision or deny the petition. If it grants the
writ, it may order the hospital to reconsider the case or take other
action required by the judgment. 222
Although an aggrieved physician has the right to judicial review,
the standard of review today is too confining, so as to make the right
hollow in cases where the physician is challenging findings of fact.
This is because the legislature rejected the standard of review adopted
in Anton, which gave the courts wide latitude to review hospital deci-
sions, and replaced it with a much more restrictive standard. Because
peer review may impair a physician's fundamental vested right to prac-
tice at a hospital, the Anton court held that the reviewing court must
evaluate hospital decisions under the "independent judgment" stan-
214. For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement and exceptions in the peer review
context, see generally Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center, 272 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1990).
215. The medical staff is also entitled to judicial review of an adverse decision, but as
the decisions discussed in this article reveal, the physician is the petitioner in most cases.
216. Anton v. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1977).
217. Id. at 1167-68.
218. An "adjudicatory" decision is one in which the administrative body's action affect-
ing an individual is determined by facts peculiar to the individual case, as opposed to a
"legislative" decision involving broad, generally applicable rules of conduct on the basis of
general public policy. Section 1094.5 is used to review adjudicatory, not legislative, deci-
sions. The latter are reviewable by traditional mandamus. Bollengier, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
Traditional mandamus is governed by CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980).
219. Anton, 567 P.2d at 1167 (Cal. 1977).
220. Id. at 1167-68.
221. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.8 (West 2003) states in pertinent part, "Nothing in
Sections 809 to 809.7, inclusive, shall affect the availability ofjudicial review under Section
1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure ....
222. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(f).
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dard, rather than the "substantial evidence" test.223 The effect of this
holding was to give the courts greater discretion to examine the ap-
propriateness of hospital decisions through a review of the case re-
cord. In a hospital peer review case, the record usually includes
transcripts of the hearing and any arguments before the hospital gov-
erning board, as well as medical exhibits and other evidence. Under
the independent judgment standard, the judge could review the re-
cord and reweigh the evidence when considering whether to grant or
deny the writ.
The Anton rule on the standard of review was short-lived. In 1979,
two years after the decision, the legislature amended section 1094.5 to
change the standard of review. The amendment applies only to deci-
sions of private hospitals. It provides that "in cases arising from private
hospital boards or boards of directors of districts organized pursuant
to The Local Hospital District Law[,] abuse of discretion 224 is estab-
lished if the court determines that the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record."2 25 Appellate courts
applying the amendment have held that the standard of review de-
pends on the nature of the petitioner's grievance. If the petition ques-
tions whether peer review was procedurally fair, the court uses its
independent judgment to determine the legitimacy of the claim. The
independent judgment standard governs issues of law, including
whether the hospital acted in excess of its jurisdiction or whether
there was a fair trial.22 6 But if the physician is challenging the factual
basis for the hospital's decision, the court may grant relief only if the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the
whole record. This amendment negated the Anton rule, which re-
quired independent review of the facts, and replaced it with one that
severely restricts the discretion of the court.
As a result, administrative mandamus is not a meaningful remedy
for physicians challenging factual determinations by a hospital. The
223. Anton, 567 P.2d at 1172-75.
224. "Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the
manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the
findings are not supported by the evidence." CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b).
225. Id. § 1094.5(d).
226. Id. § 1094.5(b). In Tiholiz v. Northridge Hospital Foundation, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338, 343
(Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeal held: "[A] litigant has a fundamental interest at stake
in procedural fairness, including but not limited to an interest in the compilation of an
accurate hearing record and having the disposition made by unbiased individuals. [Cita-
tion omitted.] Fundamental interests are protected best by employment of the indepen-
dent judgment standard in superior courts undertaking review of administrative
dispositions."
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courts may not second-guess hospital authorities-they recognize a
"strong public policy" in favor of effective peer review by hospitals.2 27
Just as courts have largely deferred to administrative expertise in de-
termining whether an applicant is qualified to practice a profession,
they also defer to administrative expertise in determining whether the
professional is qualified for hospital privileges.2 28 Under the substan-
tial evidence test, it is not the function of reviewing courts "to resolve
differences in medical judgment," but "to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the [agency's] findings and indulge all reason-
able inferences in support thereof."229 In Huang v. Board of Directors,
St. Francis Medical Center,2 30 the court of appeal explained the extent to
which the substantial evidence rule circumscribes the power of a re-
viewing court:
"The substantial evidence rule provides that where a finding of fact
is attacked on the ground it is not sustained by the evidence, the
power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncon-
tradicted, which supports the finding." The court must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving
conflicts in support of the judgment. The court is without power to
judge the effect or value of the evidence, weigh the evidence, con-
sider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evi-
dence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.
Unless a finding, viewed in light of the entire record, is so lacking
in evidentiary support as to render it unreasonable, it may not be
set aside.23 '
The amendment to section 1094.5 and the limitations of the sub-
stantial evidence standard leave physicians with little chance of over-
turning hospital decisions through judicial review. Except in cases
where hospital authorities make procedural errors or where there is
no factual basis for a decision, the policy of judicial deference makes
judicial review of peer review decisions a meaningless remedy for ag-
grieved professionals.
The restrictive standard of review not only insulates most hospital
decisions from court challenge, but it has the added effect of barring
the physician from bringing tort claims for any injuries related to peer
227. Gill v. Mercy Hosp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308 (Ct. App. 1988).
228. Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 656 P.2d 554, 563 (Cal. 1983).
229. Cipriotti v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Ctr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367,
372-73 (Ct. App. 1983).
230. 270 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1990).
231. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
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review. 232 Before the legislature imposed the substantial evidence
standard of review,2 3 3 the supreme court held, in Westlake Community
Hospital v. Superior Court,234 that a physician must first succeed in set-
ting aside the hospital's decision in a mandamus action before bring-
ing a damages suit for termination or denial of hospital privileges. 23 5
Subsequent decisions have read Westlake as requiring an ag-
grieved party to exhaust the judicial remedy of administrative manda-
mus-and to do so successfully-as a precondition to suing in tort.236
The Westlake court gave three reasons for its decision. First, it wanted
to preclude an aggrieved party from circumventing mandamus review;
second, it wished to encourage a uniform practice of judicial, rather
than jury, review of quasijudicial administrative decisions; and third,
it wanted to protect individuals who participate in judicial review (who
only enjoyed a conditional privilege from liability at the time) from
having to defend lawsuits. 23 7 It is questionable whether the reasoning
behind the second factor holds true today, when the reviewing court's
authority to grant mandamus relief is so limited. 238 Legal rules, giving
hospital authorities sweeping control over the peer review process
without allowing for meaningful judicial review of their factual find-
ings, coupled with Westlake's requirement of a success in administra-
tive mandamus as a precondition to bringing suit, are likely to
preclude the physician from ever being able to present her case to an
independent fact finding body.
232. Typical tort claims include defamation, interference with economic relationship,
unfair business practices, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Joel v.
Valley Surgical Ctr., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998).
233. The amendment requiring the substantial evidence test became law in 1978, two
years after the Westlake decision. Cipriotti, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
234. 551 P.2d 410 (Cal. 1976).
235. Id. at 411.
236. SeeJohnson v. City of Loma Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 879-80 (Cal. 2000) (discussing the
application of the Westlake rule where a city employee was suspended and delayed in pursu-
ing administrative mandamus). For application of the rule in hospital peer review, see
McNair v. Pasadena Hospital Association, 169 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Ct. App. 1980).
237. Westlake, 551 P.2d at 421-22.
238. The third rationale for the Westlake rule is also undermined because the legisla-
ture subsequently gave absolute immunity to peer review members who report to the Medi-
cal Board, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2318 (West 2003), and to persons who communicate
information to a peer review committee to aid in the evaluation of a physician's qualifica-
tions, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.8 (West Supp. 2003). One court held that a hospital is a "per-
son" under the latter code section and enjoys its immunity. Hassan v. Mercy Am. River
Hosp., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Ct. App. 2002). But see Axline v. St. John's Hosp. & Health
Ctr., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 388 (Ct. App. 1998). Witnesses at peer review hearings also enjoy
absolute immunity. CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(b) see Axline, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388-89.
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There is a solution to this problem, one that can be made without
undercutting Westlake's policy of judicial exhaustion. The legislature
could once again make administrative mandamus a meaningful rem-
edy by reverting to the independent judgment standard when the pe-
tition challenges the factual basis for the hospital's decision. This is
the standard of review that has always applied in cases challenging the
credentialing decisions of public hospitals. 239 As things stand, the re-
viewing judge is bound to affirm the hospital's decision when there is
any substantial evidence in the record to support it. A court should be
more than a rubber stamp for an administrative body's decision. Giv-
ing judges broader discretion to review the evidence will encourage
hospitals to make supportable decisions and will ensure that physi-
cians have their cases evaluated by impartial judges who are not affili-
ated with the hospital.
C. A Concern: Is Peer Review Too Cumbersome to Really Work?
This article has examined the development of medical staff peer
review law, placing a special emphasis on whether it is fair to the af-
fected physician. Although one can argue that the present system ele-
vates form over substance because hospital authorities control key
aspects of the hearing process, the formalization of peer review still
gives physicians many rights beyond common law fair procedure pro-
tections. The fact, alone, that hospitals must account for credentialing
decisions by giving specific written reasons reduces the possibility of
arbitrary and unfair actions. The danger of bias and the lack of mean-
ingful judicial review remain troubling issues but, nevertheless, the
legislative changes to peer review have increased the likelihood that a
physician will receive fair treatment.
As often happens with change, there may be a downside to the
current system. Formalization has made peer review more time-con-
suming and onerous for everyone involved. Medical staff officials, in-
cluding the MEC and chief of staff, have additional responsibilities.
They must know, understand, and follow applicable statutes and by-
laws, carefully document the reasons for decisions, and give timely
written notices as required by the rules. If the physician requests a
hearing, the MEC must identify qualified members to act as fact find-
ers and convince them to take time from their practices and personal
lives to serve. From the peer review committee member's perspective,
being on a panel can be an inconvenient, thankless task. Because it is
239. Cipriotti, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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difficult to meet during business hours, hearings are often held in the
evenings or on weekends. A hearing may last for days or even weeks.
Serving on a peer review panel places one in an uncomfortable posi-
tion, especially when a decision can destroy professional and personal
relationships. Formalized peer review can also be unpleasant for phy-
sicians who are witnesses. If the parties are represented by attorneys,
witnesses may be forced to justify their criticisms and opinions under
cross examination.
Peer review is also very costly. The medical staffs at many hospitals
retain legal counsel to provide regular advice on bylaws and their ap-
plication. If a hearing is held, the hospital must pay for the services of
a court reporter and a hearing officer, if one is used. It is not uncom-
mon for the parties to use the testimony of compensated medical ex-
pert witnesses. Where the bylaws allow for legal representation at the
hearing, each side must bear the cost. Legal fees can add up, espe-
cially for a case that is appealed to the courts.
Because peer review is cumbersome and expensive, there is the
danger that hospital authorities may try to avoid investigations requir-
ing them to report to state and federal authorities, and may instead
attempt to "settle" cases informally. For example, they could use the
threat of an investigation to force a physician to resign or surrender
privileges voluntarily. This could be an attractive alternative to a doc-
tor with a record of quality problems who wants to avoid being re-
ported. If this happens, hospitals will fail in their duty to identify
doctors who pose a danger to patients and they will neglect to alert
other hospitals, insurers, and the public, who are all entitled to the
revealing information about such doctors. Regulatory agencies should
monitor hospitals and close any reporting loopholes that they may
uncover.
Despite these possible drawbacks, the formalization of peer re-
view has helped accomplish the law's goal of balancing the interests of
the public, the hospital, and the physician. Medical staffs are free to
set standards and can police the profession by excluding or disciplin-
ing doctors who endanger patient safety. At the same time, the physi-
cian can expect a more predictable peer review process-one that
does not depend on the caprices of hospital authorities.
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